The theory of repeated games under imperfect monitoring provides a formal framework to explore the possibility of cooperation in long term relationships, where each agent's action is not directly observable. It has been successfully applied to a number of economic problems; cartel enforcement, internal labor market, and international policy coordination, to name a few. However, most theoretical or applied research on repeated games with imperfect monitoring has restricted attention to public strategies: strategies that only depend on the history of publicly observable signal, and perfect public equilibrium (PPE): sequential equilibrium in public strategies. Although public strategies are attractive due to their simplicity and tractability, they are restrictive. The present paper sheds light on the role of private strategies: strategies that depend on chosen actions as well as observed public signals. Our main message is that players can sometimes make better use of information by using private strategies and efficiency in repeated games can often be drastically improved. We take as our starting point a simple repeated partnership game with two public signal, for which Radner, Myerson, and Maskin (1986) showed that the folk theorem does not hold. For this game, we explicitly construct a symmetric sequential equilibrium using private strategies, whose equilibrium payoff Pareto-dominates the best symmetric PPE payoff. This equilibrium based on private strategies, which we call private equilibrium (PE), sometimes even achieves full efficiency.
Introduction
The theory of repeated games under imperfect monitoring provides a formal framework to explore the possibility of cooperation in long term relationships, where each agent's action is not directly observable. It has been successfully applied to a number of economic problems; cartel enforcement, internal labor market, and international policy coordination, to name a few. However, almost all existing works focus on a simple class of strategies, known as public strategies. In the present paper, we illustrate that players can make better use of information by using non-public strategies, which we call private strategies, and show that efficiency in repeated games can often be drastically improved.
In public strategies, each player's current action only depends on the history of publicly observable signal, such as market price. In other words, the players disregard their past actions. In contrast, in the present paper we allow the possibility that the players condition their actions on both the public signal and their past actions (private strategies).
A rough intuition for the improved efficiency comes from the following observation. It is often the case that a player has an inefficient action that helps to monitor other players' behavior more accurately. For example, under decreasing returns to scale, observable output becomes more sensitive to an opponent's effort when a player's effort is minimized. Hence, if the inefficient "monitoring" action is played with a small probability and the opponents are rewarded/punished only after such an action is taken, opponents' moral hazard problem is resolved more efficiently. Note that in this story it is vital that the players' future behavior (punishment/reward) depends on their past actions (the use of private strategies).
Let us explain our point in more detail with an explicit example. Consider a simple repeated partnership game with two actions {C, D}, two public signals {"good", "bad"} , where the stage game (expected) payoff matrix has the same structure as in the prisoners' dilemma. We assume that "good" is more likely to be observed when one player plays C than when no one plays C, but another C does not increase the probability of "good" much (decreasing returns to scale). In another word, Pr ("bad"|C, C) + ε = Pr ("bad"|C, D) = Pr ("bad"|D, C) < Pr ("bad"|D, D) . We restrict our attention to strongly symmetric strategies and perfect public equilibrium (PPE). 1, 2 First, note that any level of cooperation cannot be sustained in strongly symmetric pure strategies when ε is very small. The public signal is insensitive to a deviation when (C, C) is played. Now let players play the inefficient "monitoring"action D with small probability. Although the stage game payoff is less than the efficient level, now the public signal becomes more informative about players' actions. This allows players to use a mutual punishment after the signal "bad" to sustain a certain level of cooperation. 3 The level of punishment can be adjusted so that players are actually indifferent between choosing C and choosing D. This construction works, for example, when Pr ("bad"|CC) is small and players are patient enough. Note that the efficiency is improved even within the class of strongly symmetric strategy profiles by mixing D to improve the quality of monitoring.
However, we can improve efficiency further by allowing more flexible strategies. In the above strategy, the observed public signal conveys almost no information about the opponent's action when a player is playing C. Whether a player starts punishment or not after playing C and observing "bad" does not matter much in terms of keeping the other player's incentive to be cooperative. Given that the punishment occurs with positive probability, this is a pure waste of efficiency. Hence, players potentially improve efficiency by punishing the opponent only after playing D and observing "bad". 4 This explains why private strategies can help to improve efficiency. 5 In the present paper, we take as a starting point a simple repeated partnership game with two public signal. Radner, Myerson, and Maskin [15] showed for this game that the folk theorem does not hold. Using private strategies, we explicitly construct a symmetric sequential equilibrium with a payoff that Pareto-dominates the best symmetric PPE payoff. This equilibrium based on private strategies, which we call private equilibrium (PE), sometimes even achieves full efficiency.
In order to emphasize the importance of private strategies, we offer several examples. In the first example with two public signal, we show that a private equilibrium achieves almost efficiency as players become patient while the only PPE is the repetition of the one-shot Nash equilibrium. This example suggests that the difference between the PPE payoff set and the sequential equilibrium payoff set is potentially quite large. We also provide an example with three public signal where each player's deviation from (C, C) is statistically distinguished and the folk theorem holds. 6 While the PPE payoff set approximates the individually rational and feasible set as players become patient, a private equilibrium is always (strictly) more efficient than any PPE for any (large) discount factor in this example. This example clearly illustrates that our main message remains valid even under a richer information structure.
It is not an easy task to construct an equilibrium based on the idea described above. Players' continuation strategies are not common knowledge after the signal "bad" is observed. Since players continuation strategies depend on their private information once "bad" is observed, the continuation game after "bad" is equivalent to an incomplete information repeated game, where players "type" is either "played C" or "played D" in the previous period. This implies that each player has to update his/her belief about the opponent's continuation strategy over time. It is a highly complicated task to find an equilibrium profile which is sequentially rational with respect to the dynamics of belief generated by it. This observation in fact explains why there has been few works on private strategies in repeated games with imperfect monitoring.
Another contribution of the present paper then is the construction of equilibrium itself. Private strategies are constructed in such a way that players are indifferent among all the repeated game strategies. This makes a player's belief about the opponent's continuation strategy irrelevant in terms of checking sequential rationality. This construction provides a way to deal with the endogenously generated private information described above.
The idea of this strategy is indeed very powerful in dealing with private information. It can deal with not only private information about past actions but also private information about private signals if any. A similar idea was first applied by Piccione [13] in the framework of repeated games with private 6 To be precise, the distributions of the public signal given (C, C) , (C, D) and (D, C) are linearly independent. This means that the pairwise full rank condition is satisfied at (C, C) (cf. Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin [6] ). This is a sufficient condition for the folk theorem to hold. monitoring. 7 The structure of the paper is as follows. We give a simple efficiency result in Section 2. In a repeated partnership game in which the public signal distributions have moving supports, we construct a PE which approximates efficiency as δ tends to 1, while any PPE payoff is bounded away from the efficient frontier independent of the discount factor. In Section 3, we take a full support information structure which is close to the moving support information structure in Section 2. It is shown that we can still achieve almost efficiency if the full support signal distributions are enough close to the public signal distributions with the moving support in Section 2. The main purpose of this section is to introduce the idea of two state machine strategies to deal with private information. In Section 4, we take a more natural information structure studied in Radner, Myerson, and Maskin [15] . We first derive the upper bound of all the PPE payoffs, including the mixed strategy PPE payoffs. Then, we use a two state machine similar to the one introduced in the previous section and show that a symmetric PE based on the two state machine Pareto-dominates the best symmetric PPE payoff. Section 5 provides an example to emphasize a potential difference in efficiency implications by PPE and PE. We also discuss an example with three public signals to argue that our substantial insight does not depend on the assumption of two public signals and extends to a richer information structure. Section 6 is devoted to show the optimality of the particular PE studied in our paper. Although we do not prove that our PE is optimal among all sequential equilibria, we can show that it is optimal among a class of sequential equilibria. Section 7 discusses related literature and concludes.
First Efficiency Result
In this section we look at a repeated prisoners' dilemma game with imperfect public monitoring. There are two players, and two actions, C and D, are available for each player. Actions are not observable, but there is a publicly observable signal ω ∈ Ω which takes on two values, X or Y . The expected stage game payoff profiles are summarized by the following table.
Each entry of the table denotes the row player's payoff followed by the column player's. We assume that this is a prisoners' dilemma game; d, h > 0 (D is dominant) and d−h < 1 ((C, C) is efficient, that is, it Pareto-dominates the equal (public) randomization between (C, D) and (D, C)). This is a simplified version of the model examined by Radner, Myerson and Maskin [15] (abbreviated by RMM). 8 Let p(ω|a 1 , a 2 ) be the probability to observe ω given the action profile (a 1 , a 2 ), and assume the following information structure; 0 < p(X|C, C) < 1, 0 < p(X|D, D) < 1, and p(X|C, D) = p(X|D, C) = 0. The last equalities represent a "moving support" assumption, but note that this does not help to support the efficient payoff profile (1, 1) by public strategies. Also note that the prisoners' dilemma payoffs in the above table can be generated by suitable choices of realized payoffs u i (a i , ω) so as to satisfy
We first examine briefly what could be supported by PPE. The following is just a rough description and the detailed analysis of PPE will be given in Section 4. It is not difficult to show that the best strongly symmetric PPE can be achieved by the following simple strategy:
If Y is observed, randomize between going back to (1) and playing the Nash equilibrium forever using a randomization device.
Note that Y is the "bad" signal given that players are playing (C, C) . Players trigger the mutual punishment after the realization of Y with positive probability ρ ∈ (0, 1). Since the punishment occurs with positive probability, ρ is reduced up to the level where players' incentive constraints are binding. Here we allow players to use a public correlation device to coordinate their behavior to minimize the punishment. 9 The equilibrium conditions are
Then, the equilibrium payoff is given by the following formula, which is first derived in Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce [1] :
Note that the discount factor and ρ do not appear in the formula. 10 This formula is interesting because its second term provides a clear expression of the efficiency loss which is purely associated with the primitives of the stage game. In particular, we call your attention to the likelihood ratio in the denominator. The easiness of detecting the opponent's defection is a crucial factor to determine the upper bound of strongly symmetric PPE payoffs. Although there are other asymmetric equilibria such as alternating (C, D) and (D, C) , they are far from the efficient frontier as we will show in Section 4.
Now we show that the efficient payoff profile can be approximated by a private strategy. Consider the following strategy. In the initial period t = 0, each player mixes between C and D. Action D is chosen with a (small) probability q ∈ (0, 1). If the realization of the signal at the end of the current period is X and she played D, then she will play D forever. Otherwise, the player repeats the same action plan as in the initial period. Note well that (i) the players' future actions partly depend on their current actions and (ii) thanks to the assumption p(X|C, D) = p(X|D, C) = 0, when a player chose D and observes X, it is common knowledge that the other player also chose D (and of course is observing X). A strategy like this, which depends on one's past action in a nontrivial way, is called private strategy. Formally, a strategy σ i is private if there exist h 0t i and
and the public history of h 0t i and h 00t i is the same. Private equilibrium (PE) is a sequential equilibrium in private strategies. The equilibrium conditions are
Equation (1) represents the average payoff at the beginning of the initial period when the player under consideration plays C (while the opponent is employing the above strategy). In this case, the current payoff is either 1 or −h depending on the opponent's action, and punishment is surely avoided (as defection is triggered if and only if both players play D and the signal is X). On the other hand, equation (2) shows the average payoff when the player chooses D. The current payoff is either 1 + d or 0, and the punishment will be triggered when the opponent also chooses D and the signal is X. This happens with probability qp(X|D, D), so with the complementary probability, the player will enjoy the original average payoff v at the beginning of the following period. Equation (1) and (2), taken together, imply that the player is just indifferent between choosing C and D (the condition for a mixed strategy equilibrium).
From (1), we have
Also, by (1) and (2) we get
This and (3) result in a quadratic equation in q;
It is easy to show that there is a root of this equation in (0, 1) which tends to 0 as δ → 1. Equation (3) then implies that, as q tends to 0, the average payoff tends to 1, the payoff from full cooperation. This leads us to the following result.
Proposition 1 In the repeated prisoners' dilemma game defined above, there is a private equilibrium that approximately attains the fully efficient average payoff (= 1) as the discount factor tends to unity, while any perfect public equilibrium average payoff is bounded away from 1 independent of the discount factor.
Proof. To show the efficiency of the private equilibrium given above, we need to prove that a root of equation (5) lies in (0, 1) and tends to unity as δ tends to 1. At q = 0, the left hand side of (4) is strictly positive but the right hand side is equal to zero. Now let q be any number q 0 ∈ (0, 1 1+h ) and let δ tends to 1. The left hand side of (4) tends to zero, while the right hand side tends to
Thus equation (4) has a solution in (0, q 0 ) as δ tends to 1, where q 0 is any number close to 0. It can be shown that any perfect public equilibrium payoff is bounded away from 1. The details are similar to Radner, Myerson and Maskin [15] and therefore omitted.
Since it is much easier to detect the other player's defection when one defects herself, it is more efficient to trigger a punishment only after such a (private) history. Private strategies allow players to condition their strategies on the combination of action and public signal. Each player punish the opponent only at the state where the likelihood ratio with respect to the opponent's defection is maximized. This efficiency result is based on a simple principle: the efficient use of information, which is one of the main underlying theme in moral hazard models. With public strategies, a player can use this high likelihood ratio to punish the opponent only if she is playing D with high probability at the cost of reducing efficiency. Note that basically we avoid the trade-off between efficiency and detectability by utilizing private strategies.
You might wonder why these private strategies, based on a simple intuition, have rarely appeared in the literature. The answer hinges on the assumption of the moving support. It allows players to coordinate their punishment after playing D and observing X. Suppose that X is observed with probability ε when (C, D) or (D, C) is played. Then the strategy described above is not an equilibrium. The problem is that, once X is observed, a player is not sure about the opponent's continuation strategy any more. Since a player is indifferent between playing C and playing D only if she believes that her opponent is cooperating with probability 1, she cannot stay in the cooperative phase after she chose C and observes X. Furthermore, it is not difficult to show that any strategy which is close to the above strategy fails to be an equilibrium with this perturbation.
This endogenous private information and uncertainty is the most difficult problem associated with private strategies. We address this issue in the next section.
Private Strategies as Machines
Now we drop the moving support assumption p(X|C, D) = p(X|D, C) = 0 and assume instead that each signal always realizes with a positive probability. We also assume that the information structure is close to the one in the last section, that is, we assume p(X|C, C), p(X|D, D) ∈ (0, 1) as before, but p(X|C, D) = p(X|D, C) = ε, where ε is a small positive number. The reason why we choose this information structure is that (1): it is easy to see the connection to the last section and (2): the basic structure of our private equilibrium for this information structure is applicable to other information structure as we show later. All the payoff structure is the same as before. Each player randomizes in the initial period as before and her continuation strategy depends on the realization of the public signal and her mixed action. It is essential for our result that the private strategy players use is a mixed strategy. As Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti [2] noted, if the support of the public signal distribution is independent of the action profile, then for any pure strategy sequential equilibrium (henceforth any pure strategy private equilibrium), there exists a realization equivalent perfect public equilibrium. This implies that we have to look at mixed strategy private equilibria to support any payoff profile which PPE cannot support.
First we introduce a formal description of machines here because every private strategy in this paper can be described as a simple machine. A machine M i is a quadruple hΘ i , θ i,0 , q i , µ i i . In this quadruple,
is the set of states of the machine with θ i,0 being the initial state. The level of mixture between C and D at each state is determined by a function q i :
is the probability of playing D when player i is in the state θ i,n . The transition function is µ i :
The last coordinate ω i ∈ Ω i is introduced to allow random transitions over states given (θ i,n , a i , ω). Each machine M i induces a mixed strategy, which may not be a behavior strategy when the transition is random given (θ i,n , a i , ω). We denote by σ i (M i ) the behavior strategy corresponding to the mixed strategy generated by a machine M i . 11, 12 The (symmetric) private strategy we employ in this section is as follows:
• State R (Reward State):
11 Aumann (1964) [3] 12 This machine can be "purified" by introducing more (private) inputs and expanding the state space with an appropriate transition function. Choose D with probability q R (a small number). Go to state P if D was taken and X was observed (otherwise, stay in State R).
• State P (Punishment State):
Choose D with probability q P (a large number). Go to state R if C was taken and X was observed (otherwise, stay in State P ).
Hence, there are just two states Θ i = {R, P } with R being the initial state and transition is deterministic given the realized action and the realized signal . Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of this machine.
We choose q R and q P in such a way that no matter which state player 2 is in, player 1 is always indifferent between choosing C and choosing D. This is the key to our construction. When the opponent's action partly depends on his private information in a private equilibrium, a player often has to make a statistical inference about the opponent's private information to verify that her continuation strategy is sequentially rational. In our construction, however, this inference problem is irrelevant because a player is always indifferent between C and D no matter which state the opponent is in. This substantially simplifies the analysis. Also note that our transition rules are motivated by the following observation. Recall that the signal structure is such that in case of mismatch of actions ((C, D) or (D, C)), outcome X arises with a small probability ε. When a player is in a state where a particular symmetric profile, say (C, C) in state R (or (D, D) in state P ), is supposed to be taken with a large probability, each player mixes the opposite action, say D (or C respectively) with a small probability just to check if the opponent is playing the prescribed "main" action, say C (or D). When she chose the opposite action and the outcome was X, this is a very good indication that the opponent has also taken the opposite action, as X is fairly unlikely if the players' actions do not match. If this happens, the player switches to the other state to punish or reward the opponent.
When player 2 is in state R , the equilibrium conditions for player 1 are
• (player 1 plays C today)
and
• (player 1 plays D today).
When player 2 is in state P , the equilibrium conditions for player 1 are
• (player 1 plays D today)
, and
where V s can be interpreted as the discounted average payoff for player 1 when player 2 is in state s = R, P . Equation (7) and (8) imply that player 1 is indifferent between C and D when player 2 is in state R and if her continuation payoff is completely determined by her opponent's state. Similarly, (9) and (10) imply that player 1 is indifferent between C and D when player 2 is in state P . Looking at these equations carefully, we can see that player 2's state indeed determines player 1's continuation payoff completely as we assumed. Any payoff difference one can make in the current period is offset by the difference of the continuation payoffs. In principle, player 1's continuation payoff should depend on player 1's continuation strategy as well as player 2's state, but player 1 is completely indifferent among all the repeated game strategies as long as player 2 plays according to the two state machine described above. As a consequence, this machine is sequentially rational to itself. Let us emphasize again that a player never knows what is the opponent's continuation strategy or which state the opponent is in during the game. However, players do not have to know them because their expected payoffs cannot be affected by their own strategies. Note that this logic is similar to the one for a totally mixed strategy equilibrium in a finite normal form game. What is interesting is that the same thing is done for an infinite game with only a finite number of equations.
Here we have four equations and four unknowns (V R , V P , q R , and q P ). If we have solutions in the relevant range (q R , q P ∈ [0, 1]), then this machine constitutes a private equilibrium. Manipulating the first two equations for V R , we get (supposing q R → 0 as δ → 1):
and the remaining two equations for V P yield (supposing q P → 1 as δ → 1):
The interpretation of (11) is parallel to the one in Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce [1] . It is the (cooperative) stage game payoff minus the deviation gain over the likelihood ratio minus 1. Observe that this likelihood ratio is now
. This reflects the fact that D is the action to monitor the opponent. We can see that V R → 1 as this information structure converges to the one with moving support in Section 2 (ε → 0) . These observations lead to the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In the repeated prisoners' dilemma game defined above, there is a private equilibrium that approximately attains 1 − as the discount factor tends to unity, which converges to 1 as ε → 0, while any perfect public equilibrium average payoff is bounded away from 1 independent of the discount factor for each ε.
Repeated Partnership Games
In this section, we study a partnership game with a more typical information structure. We assume that
The idea is that the "bad" signal X is more likely to realize as more players defect. This is similar to the information structure in RMM [15] . There are two important points which are worth emphasizing here. First, we do not expect to approximate full efficiency in this setting, at least with our private strategies. Likelihood ratio is a very important factor to determine the efficiency loss as seen in the last sections. Since the likelihood ratio is bounded above, there should remains a significant efficiency loss. This results in more subtle comparison between PPE and PE because both equilibrium payoffs are bounded away from the efficient frontier. This calls upon a careful characterization of the PPE payoff set. Second, we need an assumption on the information structure to make our private strategies more efficient than public strategies. The advantage of private strategies we saw was that they made it easier for a player to detect the opponent's defection when a player defects herself. We impose the following condition to use this insight in the current setting.
Note that this implies decreasing returns to scale:
be the likelihood ratio of the signal X with respect to the defection when a player is playing C and D with probability 1 − q and q. We first derive the upper bound of the PPE payoff set in the next subsection. It is an analogue of RMM inefficiency result for this discrete version of partnership games.
The Upper Bound of PPE
The upper bound of the pure strategy strongly symmetric PPE payoff is easy to obtain. Let v ps be the best pure strategy strongly symmetric PPE payoff. Since there are only two signals available, it is not possible to "reward" one player when the other player is "punished". Both player has to be punished at the same time when the signal X is observed. So it is efficient to set the punishment level as small as the level where players are indifferent between C and D. When the signal Y is observed, it is efficient to use v ps again. These observations lead to a recursive equation:
where ρ is a probability to trigger punishment given that X is observed. The indifference condition is given by:
Solving equations (13) and (14) for v ps and ρ, the following formula is obtained.
as described in the introduction. The best strongly symmetric PPE can be a mixed one, that is, it is sometimes necessary to use mixed strategies to achieve the maximum efficient payoff even within the class of strongly symmetric public strategies. 13 In such a case, the best mixed strategy symmetric PPE is obtained just by mixing C and D with probability 1 − q and q instead of using the profile (C, C) in (#). Solving a recursive equation and an indifference condition similar to (13) and (14), we can obtain the equilibrium payoff of such a mixed PPE:
The interpretation of this formula is the same as before. Note that if q = 0, then this is equivalent to (15) . Why can mixing help to improve the best strongly symmetric PPE payoff even though it reduces the efficiency in the stage game? It is because the efficiency loss associated with the punishment might decrease. We can see from the above formula that (1): deviation gain can become small if d > h or/and (2): the likelihood ratio may increase. Now let q * = arg max
The following is the formal statement with respect to the bound of strongly symmetric PPE payoffs including mixed ones.
Proposition 3
The bound of the strongly symmetric PPE payoffs of this repeated partnership game is given by v ss = max
This bound is a tight one. Either the stationary strategy described
or any level of cooperation cannot be sustained. In order to get the bound of all the symmetric PPE payoff, we have to deal with the cases where the optimal strategy pair is asymmetric. If that possibility is taken account, the upper bound has to be modified in the following way:
The bound of the symmetric PPE payoff of this repeated partnership game is given by v s = max
Interestingly, it turns out that when an asymmetric strategy achieves the best symmetric payoff, at least one player has to play D with probability 1 in the first period. The equilibrium where each player uses a different nondegenerate behavior strategy in the first period is not an efficient one. This is because we have only two public signals. 14 Given this, it is clear that 1+d−h 2 is the upper bound for PPE when it is achieved by asymmetric public strategies. Figure 2 illustrates that if the best symmetric PPE (denoted by V s ) with (D, C) in the initial period is more than
, then the continuation payoff profile (denoted by W ) cannot stay in the PPE payoff set. 15
It is easy to find a set of parameter profiles for which 1+d−h 2 is really the upper bound obtained by an asymmetric PPE where players play (C, D) (D, C) alternatively. However, this bound may not be always tight. When p (X|a) is linearly increasing in the number of defections, which is the case analyzed in detail by Fudenberg and Levine [7] , the bound in Proposition 4 is tight in the sense that one of the three numbers
o is the upper bound and there exists a strategy which achieves this upper bound. Otherwise, there may exist the best symmetric PPE payoff achieved by some asymmetric strategy, which does not hit the above bound.
Constructing Private Equilibrium
In this subsection, a PE is constructed and compared to the bound of the symmetric PPE payoffs obtained in the last subsection. The private strategy is still described by a machine M i = hΘ i , θ i,0 , f i , µ i i where Θ i = {R, P } and θ i,0 = R. However, µ i is now slightly more complex because players transit among the states randomly after a certain combination of action and public signal. Let ω i be distributed uniformly on [0, 1] independent of the other variables. We use the following transition function µ i :
Player i is using ω i to randomize between staying P and moving to R when player i 0 s action is D and a signal Y is observed. We control the level of punishment by choosing suitable ρ i . Since the strategy is symmetric, the subscript i will be omitted from now on. Figure 3 shows how this strategy looks like. Players are in state R in the initial period. They move to state P if and only if they play D and observe X. At state P, they move back to state R if and only if they play D, observe Y and ω ∈ [0, ρ]. With this private strategy, players can spend most of their time in state R playing C and start the punishment only after (D, X) .
Most important elements of the strategy σ (M ) are f (R) = q R and f (P ) = q P . They are defined to be solutions to the following equations.
( * )
here there are five unknowns (V R , V P , q R , q P , ρ) . If the solution (q * R , q * P ) of these equations are in [0, 1] , then these numbers can be used as the values of the function f (.) and generate a behavior strategy σ (M ) . The interpretation of the above four equations are exactly as in Section 3.
The following main proposition shows that for δ close to 1, we can find a solution (q * R (δ) , q * P (δ) , ρ * (δ) , V * R (δ) , V * P (δ)) parameterized by δ for the above equations ( * ) such that q * R (δ) (> 0) → 0 as δ → 1 and q * P (δ) = 1 with an appropriately chosen ρ * (δ)
, the payoff arbitrary close to 1 − d L 1 −1 is achieved as a PE as δ → 1. Note that this formula uses the likelihood ratio L 1 instead of L 0 , but otherwise it looks exactly like the best strongly symmetric PPE payoff.
Then for any η > 0, there exists a δ such that for all δ ∈ (δ, 1) , there exists a symmetric private strategy pair (σ (M (δ)) , σ (M (δ))) parameterized by δ, which is a sequential equilibrium with a compatible belief system and generates the symmetric equilibrium payoff
Proof. Given that 0 < δ < 1, we can derive the following system of equations equivalent to ( * ).
( * * )
Once q R is obtained, then V R , V P are obtained by (16) and (17) respectively. Since ρ can be an arbitrary number between 0 and 1, it is set to be
17) and q P = 1 for V R , V P , q P in (18), we get a quadratic equation, whose solution can be used for q R :
, which is negative by assumption. So, there exists a q R (δ) ∈ (0, 1) for large enough δ such that q R (δ) → 0 as δ → 1. V R and V P can be derived from (16) and (17) with this q R (δ) and q P = 1. Hence we get a parametrized solution
, then there exists a δ such that for all δ ∈ (δ, 1) , the equilibrium payoff generated by (σ (M (δ)) , σ (M (δ))) is larger than v s .
Proof. We just need to show that 1 −
This holds by assumption.
18 A player can go to off the equilibarium path only when she deviates herself. Since any deviation is not observable to the opponent, she update her belief using the opponent's equilibrium strategy.
Although many restrictions are imposed on the structure of the stage game to get this result, there still exists an open set of parameters which satisfies all these restrictions. One example in the next section satisfies this restriction.
Examples
In this section, we provide two examples. In the first example with two public signals, a PE is shown to be much more efficient than any PPE. The second example suggests that our insight about private strategies is also valid in cases where the public signal takes on more than two values.
Example 1:
It is assumed that d = κ > 0, h = 1 + κ > 0, and
where ² is a small positive number. 19 Note that the assumptions for Proposition 5 or 6 are satisfied for small ε if κ < 1. As ε becomes small, it becomes more difficult to detect the opponent's deviation when (C, C) is played.
It is easy to see that strongly symmetric PPE do not work. A player has to mix D to monitor the opponent effectively, but the stage game payoff decreases significantly if both players do so. This negative effect overcomes the positive effect which comes from the improved monitoring, hence any cooperation is not sustainable in strongly symmetric strategies. This is clear from the formula for the best (nontrivial) strongly symmetric PPE payoff. When ² is small, the formula 1 − q − qh −
is approximately
, which is a negative number.
19 When a player is playing C, the distribution of the public signal is not so sensitive to the other player's action. This implies that the realized payoffs have to be very big to generate the fixed expected payoff matrix as ² becomes small. In particular, u (C, X) → −∞ and u (C, Y ) → ∞ as ² → 0.
Also note that we need ² to be strictly positive. Otherwise, we cannot recover the expected payoff matrix assumed here.
Another candidate of the PPE upper bound is simply 1+d−h 2 = 0 by Proposition 4. So there exists a ² such that for ² ∈ (0, ²) the only PPE is the repetition of the one shot Nash equilibrium On the other hand, the private equilibrium payoff approximates 1 − d L 1 −1 = 1 − κ as δ → 1 when ² is small. Since κ is an arbitrary small positive number, we can construct an example where the PE approximates the efficient outcome arbitrarily closely and the only PPE is the repetition of the one-shot Nash equilibrium.
Example 2:
The next example shows that even when the folk theorem holds, for any given discount factor δ < 1, a PE does better than any PPE. It is a version of the prisoners' dilemma, whose expected stage game payoffs are given by the following table. 20
The public signal ω takes on three values, X, Y 1 , and Y 2 , and the probability distributions are given below.
Note that, as long as ² > 0, the pairwise full rank condition (PFR) is satisfied at (C, C), that is, the first three rows are linearly independent. 21 This means that each player's defection at (C, C) is statistically discriminated (player i's deviation makes signal Y i more likely, i = 1, 2). Hence the Fudenberg-Levine-Maskin Folk Theorem applies, and the efficient payoff (1, 1) can be approximately achieved by a PPE in the repeated game as δ → 1. Also note that this is similar to the model in Section 2, where signal X arises only when both players take the same action. Therefore, by a similar construction, the efficient payoff (1, 1) can also be approximately achieved by a PE as δ → 1. In summary, in this example both PPE and PE asymptotically achieves efficiency as δ → 1. We show, however, the PE in Section 2 does better than any PPE for each δ < 1.
Formally, we derive the following upper bound of the best symmetric PPE payoffs.
Proposition 7 For any (large) H > 0, there is a (small enough) value of the signal distribution parameter ² > 0 such that
is an upper bound of the best symmetric PPE payoffs under δ.
Note that, when H is large, the upper bound is a steep (almost linear) curve for δ sufficiently close to 1 (and otherwise it is 0). The proof is given in Appendix B. Intuitively, this bound is derived by the following observation. It turns out that in our example positive payoffs cannot be sustained if we punish the players simultaneously. However, as long as ² > 0, we can utilize an asymmetric punishment where we "transfer" player i's future payoff to player j, when player i's defection is suspected (i.e., when Y i arises). Hence to support a payoff profile by a PPE, we must require the future payoffs to vary in the northwest/southeast directions around the payoff profile to be supported. As the players' defections become indistinguishable (² → 0), however, we need huge payoff transfers to support cooperation, and for those transfers to be in the equilibrium payoff set the discount factor should be sufficiently large. This observation provides a lower bound of δ to support the given payoff profile, which in turn provides the upper bound of the PPE payoffs in Proposition 7.
On the other hand, the construction of our private equilibrium in Section 2 only relies on p(X|D, D) > 0 = p(X|D, C) = p(X|C, D), and as a result it is also an equilibrium in the three signal example considered here. In Section 2, we derived the equilibrium probability q i of defection for each player i, given by the following quadratic equation in q;
Note that in the current example, we have h = 6, d = 1 and p(X|DD) = 1/3. Hence (24) becomes
As f (0) = 3(1 − δ) > 0 and f (1) = 18 − 12δ > 0, if we have real solutions they both lie in [0, 1]. As we are interested in the most efficient equilibrium (hence the one with the smallest q), we choose the smaller root
Calculation shows that this solution is real when δ ≥ 0.992. The associated symmetric private equilibrium payoff for each player is v (δ) = 1−7q(δ). Note that this value is independent of ². Hence we conclude that in our example with small ² > 0, a PE does better than any PPE for each δ < 1.
Optimality of Private Strategies
Although we show that a private strategy sometimes does a better job than public strategies, it is not clear whether what we constructed is an optimal sequential equilibrium. There may be a more complicated private strategy which achieves a more efficient symmetric payoff. At this point, the characterization of the most efficient sequential equilibrium payoff is beyond our reach. However, we establish in this section that the private strategy we employed in the previous sections is optimal in a class of strategies.
The class of strategy we look at is an extension of our two-state machine strategies in the sense that it allows players to use any countable number of states. Player i's strategy is represented as a machine
n=0 , θ i,0 , q i , µ i´. Let's denote player i's continuation strategy at the state θ i,n by σ n i . We impose the following condition on equilibria.
For any σ i ∈ {σ
This is a natural class of equilibrium which contains the previous twostate private equilibrium. Player i is indifferent among σ n i ∈ {σ n i }
n=0 whatever the opponent's state is, and her payoff is determined purely by player j's state. Let us call this class of equilibrium totally indifferent equilibrium.
Suppose that
n=0 , θ 2,0 , q 2 , µ 2´c onstitutes a totally indifferent equilibrium. We first prove that we can always find a simple two state machine totally indifferent equilibrium which (weakly) Pareto-dominates such totally indifferent equilibrium with many states. In another word, there is no loss of generality to restrict attention to two state machines in terms of efficiency in this class of equilibria.
Lemma 8 For any totally indifferent equilibrium, there exists a two state totally indifferent equilibrium which (weakly) Pareto-dominates such equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix. The intuition of the proof is very simple. Player i 0 s state θ 1,n and continuation strategy σ n i determines player j 0 s payoff completely. If the number of the states is finite, then there exist player i 0 s state θ 1 which maximizes player j 0 s payoff and θ 1 which minimizes player j 0 s payoff. Then player i can generate player j's payoff at θ 1,n by randomly moving to θ 1 and θ 1 instead of moving to θ 1,n . Hence, she needs only two states to generate the payoff at θ 1 . When the number of the states is not finite, we can construct the two states which maximizes/minimizes the opponent's average payoff. Now we can prove the following result, which implies that our PE is the best totally different equilibrium.
Proposition 9
The best nontrivial symmetric payoff (> 0) in totally indifferent equilibria is bounded by
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to machines with two states {θ i,0 , θ i,1 } by lemma 8. Then, there exists the best two state machine in totally indifferent equilibria because the set of strategies is compact. Take the best two state machine. We can also assume that player i always stay at θ i,0 in the second period after Y is realized. Otherwise, by modifying player i 0 s strategy in such a way in the initial period, we can construct a more efficient totally indifferent equilibrium with a three state machine. This is a contradiction because the best totally indifferent equilibrium can be implemented by a two state machine and the original two state machine is assumed to be the best one among two state totally indifferent equilibria.
Let V i be the average payoff when the opponent is in state i, i = 1, 2. The recursive equation is given by:
and V 0 , V 00 are linear combinations of V 0 and V 1 . 22, 23 This is equivalent to
The incentive constraint is given by:
¢ª Let x * = V 0 − V 0 and y * = V 0 − V 00 . Then (x * , y * ) has to solve the following linear programing problem.
, then y * = 0 and x * is the number which satisfies the incentive constraint with equality. If
, then x * = 0 and y * is the number which satisfies the incentive constraint with equality. 22 Subscript is omitted because the analysis is the same for both players. 23 Note that both player has to play C (and D) at some state to support any nontrivial symmetric payoff (> 0) . This is why a player is playing C in the recursive equation and the incentive constraint has to be binding.
In the former case,
In the latter case,
where q 0 is the number which satisfies the incentive constraint with equality. However, it can be close to 0 if δ is large enough, hence V 0 is as high as
We have a couple of comments. First, if L 0 ≥ L 1 , then our PE cannot be better than the best symmetric PPE because the bound 1 − d L 0 −1 can be obtained by a PPE. Second, if the assumptions for Proposition 6 are satisfied, then our PE is the best among totally indifferent equilibria for large δ. This follows from the following two observations; (i)
Related Literature and Comments
There are a few works on private strategies although their focuses are quite different from this paper's. Lehrer [9] uses private strategies as endogenous correlation devices in repeated games without discounting. Mailath, Matthews, and Sekiguchi [11] offers examples of finitely repeated games where the use of private strategies makes a difference.
There are a couple of comments on the robustness of the private equilibria. First, when the parameters such as (d, h, p (X|CC) , p (X|CD) , p (X|DD)) change slightly, there exists a PE close to the original PE. Secondly, suppose that each player can observe additional signals which are informative about the other player's current state. Our PE still continues to be a sequential equilibrium in that setting because a player does not have to know which state the other player is in. Finally, note that this strategy works even if there is no public signal at all, in which case PPE does not have any bite by definition. To see this, suppose that the stage game is perturbed in the following way: the public signal follows the same distribution as before, but it is not observable to players. Instead, each player observes a public signal plus a private noise. Players observe the true public signal most of the time, but observe the wrong one with a small probability. The private strategy works even in this setting. Since players do not have to know the other player's state, it is not important whether a player could observe the signal which her opponent receives.
Formally, this modified model belongs to repeated games with private monitoring. The method in this paper to deal with private information is indeed applicable to this wider class of model. Ely and Välimäki [5] independently found a similar two state machine strategy in repeated games with private monitoring. As in this paper, a player is indifferent among all the repeated game strategies whatever state the opponent is in. The idea behind these strategies was first found by Piccione [13] , where the equilibrium strategy is basically a machine with a countably infinite number of states.
However, there is a critical difference between our paper and Ely and Välimäki [5] . In Ely and Välimäki, a player plays a pure action at each state and the transitions between states is random. The transition probability depends on the current state and the realization of private signal so as to make the opponent indifferent. As in this paper, it does not matter whether a player knows the opponent's state (henceforth action) or not. However, it is important for us that a player does not know what action the opponent is choosing. If a player knows the opponent's action, she is more tempted to defect when C is being played and more likely to cooperate when the "monitoring" action D is being played. Since players need to use the actionsignal pair without being noticed for the efficient punishment,they do not play a pure action at the reward state in our paper. This efficient use of the signaling structure is our main focus. The idea of efficient monitoring is an old and simple idea which lies at the heart of moral hazard models. This paper suggests a way to use private information to enhance the informational efficiency in repeated games/dynamic moral hazard models.
Another point about the above modified private monitoring model is that it is not a model with almost perfect monitoring, where players are almost certain about the other players' actions. Repeated games with almost perfect private monitoring has been the main focus of private monitoring literature (such as [4] , [5] , [13] , [16] ). The game we described above is a repeated game with almost public monitoring (Mailath and Morris [10] ). Hence our PE can be regarded as an example of sequential equilibria which work with almost public private monitoring but not almost perfect.
Observe how this strategy is related to the conditions suggested by Mailath and Morris [10] . They suggested the conditions under which a particular PPE remains a sequential equilibrium with an almost public moni-toring when a public signal structure is perturbed slightly with private noise. Their conditions require players to have almost common knowledge about the other players' continuation strategies all the time. Our PE clearly does not satisfy this sufficient condition. On the contrary, its property is rather orthogonal to this requirement. Players do not have to have any additional knowledge about the opponent's continuation strategy through the course of the game.
There is one important open question left. Although we could show that a PE can be much more efficient than PPE, we have not characterized the best symmetric sequential equilibrium payoff yet. More insight is needed to see whether a version of the inefficiency result by RMM extends to the whole set of sequential equilibria or some efficiency result stands out surprisingly.
appendix A: proofs Proof of Proposition 3 . Let us first prove a useful lemma which generally holds for the best symmetric PPE payoff with public correlation devices. We are looking at symmetric payoffs, but in the lemma we do not restrict our attention to strongly symmetric equilibria. Also note that the best symmetric PPE can be found by maximizing the sum of two players' payoffs over the set of PPE payoff profiles. The set of PPE payoff profiles is denoted by V P P E (δ) in the following.
Lemma 10 Let (v * , v * ) be the best symmetric PPE payoff in repeated partnership games. Then, there is a PPE which achieves the same total payoff 2v * and do not use any public correlation device in the initial period. Furthermore, the sum of the expeceted stage payoffs in the initial period is no less than 2v * .
Proof. When the best symmetric PPE payoff is achieved by public randomization over some PPE, each of them must obtain the same, nonnegative total payoff 2v * (otherwise, we can just pick up (v 1 , v 2 ) with the highest total payoff and achieve a higher symmetric payoff by equally randomizing over (v 1 , v 2 ) and (v 2 , v 1 ), a contradiction). Pick up any one of those PPE. By definition, it does not use any public randomization in the first period, and therefore it is achieved by a current (possibly mixed) action profile α and continuation payoffs (V 1 (ω), V 2 (ω)). The sum of payoffs satisfies
where g i is player i's payoff function and E [ |α ] is the expectation under α. If g 1 (α) + g 2 (α) < 2v * , the sum of payoffs associated with this PPE would be
This contradicts our assumption that (v * , v * ) is the best symmetric PPE payoff profile. Hence
Note that this proof only relies on the fact that (0, 0) is the mutual mixmax. In particular, the space of public signal can be arbitrary. We use this lemma later when we analyze a partenrship game with three public signal.
Let v s (> 0) be the best symmetric PPE payoff in the current repeated partnership game. Lemma 10 implies that (i) there exists a PPE payoff profile (v 1 , v 2 ) such that 2v s = v 1 + v 2 , (ii) players do not use a public correlation device in the initial period, and (iii) at least one player is playing C in th einitial period. Suppose that both players play C with positive probability in the initial period for now. We come back to the case where one player plays D with probability 1 when we deal with all the asymmetric strategies in the next proposition. Let q i < 1 be the probability for player i to play D in the initial period. v 1 and q 2 satisfy the following inequality derived from the recursive equation:
, and the incentive constraint:
1 is player 1's continuation payoff after signal Y. Equation 28 means that if the continuation payoff after signal X decreased by ρ 1 v * 1 , then player 1 would be indifferent between C and D. Since the true punishment associated with v 1 should be as harsh as this hypothetical punishement, we have the inequality 27.
Similar inequality and equation hold for player 2:
) Adding (27) and (29) and using v * 1 + v * 2 5 v 1 + v 2 , we get
Substituting (28) and (30) into this equation ,
Note that the bound of player 1's (2's) payoff only depends on q 2 (q 1 ) . Then, q 1 = q 2 = q * gives the optimal bound of v 1 + v 2 and
It is clear that this bound is achieved by the strongly symmetric strategy PPE where mixing C and D with (1 − q * , q * ) is used instead of (C, C) in (#) and that v s = v 1 = v 2 .¥ Note that the above proof shows that the best strongly symmetric PPE payoff achieves the best symmetric payoff even among a large class of asymmetric strategies(i.e. both players play C with positive probability.). This implies that if any asymmetric profile is used to support v s , then one player has to play D with probability 1 in the initial period. This fact makes the proof of the next proposition simple.
Proof of Proposition 4
We only need to consider the case where one player plays D with probability 1 in the initial period. Suppose that this player is player 2 without loss of generality. Then, Lemma 10 immediately implies that the best symmetric PPE payoff is bounded by 1+d−h 2
. Combining this observation with the previous proposition, the result is obtained.¥
Proof of Lemma 8
We assume that each player has at least one state where C is played with positive probability. 24 Suppose first that the equilibrium strategy has only a finite number of states. Then, we can pick player i 0 s state, say, θ i,0 , which maximizes player j 0 s continuation payoff, and θ i,1 , which minimizes player j 0 s continuation payoff. Now we modify player i 0 s machine in the following way. When player i is supposed to be at θ i,n after some action and signal or in the initial period, she instead move to θ i,0 and θ i,1 with probability 1 − λ n and λ n such that
¢ . This defines a modified machine with two states {θ i,0 , θ i,1 } with the initial state θ i,0 , keeping q i (.) fixed. Let σ 00 i and σ 01 i be the new two continuation strategies starting from θ i,0 or θ i,1 . Two recursive equations concerning to θ i,0 and θ i,1 now determine the new values of V j ¡ σ 00 i , .
¢ uniquely. Since these values are clearly the same as before, all the incentive constraints at θ i,0 and θ i,1 are equivalent, hence satisfied. Since the same procedure can be applied to both players, these two state machines are able to generate a sequential equilibrium which Pareto-dominates the original finite state machine.
If the number of the states is countable, we might not able to find the best state and the worst state. In such a case, we construct them in the following way. Since the set of continuation payoffs are bounded, there exists the least upper bound V j and the largest lower bound V j (∈ [0, 1 + g]) of all the continuation payoffs of this totally indifferent equilibrium. Then we can find σ m(n) i is complete. 25 ¥ From the above proof, it is also clear that any payoff in £ V j , V j ¤ can be supported as well by randomizing between θ i,0 and θ i,1 in the initial period.
Appendix B: Example 2 Let q i be the probability that player i chooses action D. Given q j , the probability of X when player i chooses C and D are respectively 1 3 (1 − q j ) and 1 3 q j , as X arises only when both players take the same action. Hence we have the following simple but useful observation.
Lemma 11
When player i deviates from C to D while the opponent chooses D with probability q j , outcome X becomes less likely iff q j < 1/2.
Let F be the sum of the expected stage payoffs under (q 1 , q 2 ),
We note that this is positive only if both players choose D with sufficiently low probability.
Lemma 12
The sum of the stage payoffs is positive only if q 1 , q 2 < 1/3.
Proof. Note that F (q 1 , q 2 ) is linear in q 1 and that both F (0, q 2 ) = 2−6q 2 and F (1, q 2 ) = 4(q 2 −1) are non-positive if q 2 ≥ 1/3. Hence F (q 1 , q 2 ), which is a convex combination of those values, is non-positive if q 2 ≥ 1/3. Symmetric argument shows that F is non-positive if q 1 ≥ 1/3. Hence F is positive only if q 1 , q 2 < 1/3.
The following is a immediate corollary from the above two lemmata.
Corollary 13
When the sum of the stage game payoffs is positive, outcome X becomes less likely if player i defects given player j's mixed action.
Combining Lemma 12 and Corollary 13 with Lemma 10, we have: 25 The same procedure can be applied to an example in Piccione [13] to reduce a countable state machine to a two state machine.
Proposition 14
For any parameter of information structure ² ∈ [0, 1/2), if the best symmetric PPE payoff v * is not 0, then there is a (possibly asymmetric) PPE with the same total payoff 2v * , where in the first period (i) no public correlation device is used,(ii) each player chooses D with probability less than 1/3, and (iii) unilateral defection of each player makes outcome X less likely. Now we use this fact to show the following.
Proposition 15
The best symmetric PPE payoff is 0 for all δ ∈ [0, 1) when the parameter of the information structure ² is equal to 0.
Proof. Suppose v * > 0 and choose the equilibrium stated in the above Proposition. When ² = 0, we can regard Y 1 and Y 2 as a single outcome Y . Note that as D is dominant in the stage game, a player always has a shortterm incentive to defect, irrespective of the opponent's mixing probability q j . Then the above Proposition shows that both payers must be punished when Y realizes. The associated likelihood ratio for player i given player j 0 s mixed action is
, and by a similar argument to the proof of Proposition 3, we have
Note that 1 − 7q j is the stage payoff when player i plays C and player j is choosing D with probability q j , and (1 − q j ) × 1 + q j × 6 = 1 + 5q j is player i's current gain from defection in the same situation. As L
which, together with (31), contradicts our presumption v * > 0. Hence we conclude that best symmetric equilibrium payoff is 0 when ² = 0.
Next we derive an upper bound the symmetric PPE payoffs. Let v * (δ) be the best symmetric PPE payoff under δ. We suppress δ when no confusion ensues. If v * is positive, the Proposition 14 shows that there is a PPE achieving the same total payoff 2v * , where a possibly mixed action is chosen (but no public correlation device is used) in the first period. Let q i be the probability that player i chooses action D in the first period (i = 1, 2). The average payoff profile of such an equilibrium, denoted (v 0 1 , v 0 2 ), must satisfy the following "dynamic programming" conditions.
In the above expression p(ω|a, q) denotes the probability of ω when a player chooses action a (a = C, D) and the opponent chooses D with probability q (note the symmetry of p(ω|·, ·)). The continuation payoff profile is represented by (v 1 (ω), v 2 (ω)). Equations (33) and (34) respectively represent player i's payoff when she plays C or D in the first period. Together they imply that player i is indifferent between C and D.
By summing up (1 − q i ) ×(33)+q i ×(34) for i = 1, 2 and using (32), we can calculate the total payoff associated with the mixed strategy profile as
Note that the first term is (1 − δ) times the sum of expected stage payoffs, which we formerly defined as F . Also note that p(ω|q 1 , q 2 ) is the probability of ω when players mix D with probabilities q 1 and q 2 . Subtract 2δv * = 2δ(v 0 1 + v 0 2 ) from both sides and divide by (1 − δ) to obtain
where (∆ 1 (ω), ∆ 2 (ω)) represents total (as opposed to average) future payoff variations (around the "best" PPE payoff profile (v 0 1 , v 0 2 )):
Note that the future payoff variations (∆ 1 (ω), ∆ 2 (ω)) have to satisfy some conditions. First, it must provide right incentive for each player. Subtracting (33) from (34) and dividing through by (1 − δ), we have (binding) incentive constraints
, for i, j = 1, 2 and j 6 = i.
Note that the left hand side is the short term gain from defection, while the right hand side shows the reduction of the future payoffs. Secondly, the future payoffs (v 1 (ω), v 2 (ω)) should be chosen from the set of PPE payoffs V P P E (δ). By the definition (36), this condition is represented as
Let us now summarize what we have found.
Lemma 16 Let v * be the best symmetric PPE payoff under discount factor δ. Then, there exist q 1 , q 2 ∈ [0, 1/2) and (∆ 1 (ω), ∆ 2 (ω)) that satisfy the dynamic programming value equation (35), the incentive constraint (37) and the PPE condition (38) for some feasible payoff profile
To get an upper bound for v * , we will relax condition (38). First, let V F be the feasible payoff set, that is, the convex hull of stage payoffs
Note that V P P E (δ) ⊂ V F . As 2v * is the maximized sum of the two players' payoffs over V P P E (δ), we also have
The part of the efficient frontier connecting two payoff profiles (1, 1) and (2, −6) is given by 
Let us now derive an upper bound of symmetric PPE payoffs. To this end, we first find a lower bound of discount factor to support a symmetric payoff v * ∈ (0, 1). Fix any v * ∈ (0, 1). Lemma 16 shows that there is a feasible payoff profile (v 0 1 , v 0 2 ) such that v 0 1 + v 0 2 = 2v * . Then, condition (40) implies (by the first inequality on the right hand side) As (2 − 6q 2 − 6q 1 + 10q 1 q 2 ) is the sum of stage payoffs, it is less than or equal to 2. This and 0 ≤ v * imply −2 ≤ X ω (∆ 1 (ω) + ∆ 2 (ω))p(ω|q 1 , q 2 ).
Let r be the minimum probability of outcome X when players choose D with probabilities q 1 , q 2 ∈ [0, 1/2]: r = min q 1 ,q 2 p(X|q 1 , q 2 ) subject to q 1 , q 2 ∈ [0, 1/2]. Note that p(X|q 1 , q 2 ) < p(Y i |q 1 , q 2 ), i = 1, 2 independent of ² > 0. Clearly, r > 0, and (41) and the definition of r implies P ω (∆ 1 (ω) + ∆ 2 (ω))p(ω|q 1 , q 2 ) ≤ r min ω (∆ 1 (ω) + ∆ 2 (ω)). Hence the condition (42) implies −2 ≤ r min ω (∆ 1 (ω) + ∆ 2 (ω)).Thus we have another condition for (∆ 1 (ω), ∆ 2 (ω)); ∀ω − 2/r ≤ ∆ 1 (ω) + ∆ 2 (ω).
Now we present a crucial observation that we need large payoff variations of (∆ 1 (ω), ∆ 2 (ω)) in the northwest/southeast directions as ² → 0. That is, as we approach the information structure where the pairwise full rank condition fails, we need large payoff transfers between the players to support a positive payoff v * .
Lemma 17 For any (large) K > 0, there is (small) ² > 0 such that for each q 1 , q 2 ∈ [0, 1/2], if (∆ 1 (·), ∆ 2 (·)) satisfies conditions (37), (41) and (42), then ∀ω ∆ 1 (ω), ∆ 2 (ω) ≤ K cannot hold..
Proof. Suppose that the assertion is not true. Then, there is a sequence {² n , ∆ n 1 , ∆ n 2 , q n 1 , q n 2 } such that ² n → 0, as n → ∞, which satisfies (37), (41), (42), and ∀ω ∆ 1 (ω), ∆ 2 (ω) ≤ K. The condition (41), (43) implied by (42) and ∀ω ∆ 1 (ω), ∆ 2 (ω) ≤ K imply that the sequence lies in a compact set, and we can choose a converging subsequence. Let (∆ 0 1 , ∆ 0 2 q 0 1 , q 0 2 ) be its limit, where (∆ 0 1 , ∆ 0 2 ) supports C with probability more than 1/2 for each player when ² = 0. However, since we can regard Y 1 and Y 2 as a single outcome Y when ² = 0, the following inequality holds as in Proposition 15. 
This contradicts the fact that the limit (∆ 0 1 , ∆ 0 2 ) also satisfies (42).
Note that given K > 0, the choice of ² is independent of the initial choice of (v 0 1 , v 0 2 ) and v * in the above proof. If ² chosen is small enough, then ∀ω ∆ 1 (ω), ∆ 2 (ω) ≤ K cannot hold for any (v 0 1 , v 0 2 ) and v * . Now define A = {(∆ 1 , ∆ 2 ) |∆ 1 + ∆ 2 ≤ 0 and − 2/r ≤ ∆ 1 + ∆ 2 } , and
Conditions (41), (43) and Lemma 17 implies that we can always choose (small enough) ² in such a way that for some ω, (∆ 1 (ω), ∆ 2 (ω)) lies in the region A \ B. Let us now summarize what we have found as follows.
Proposition 18 For any (large) K > 0, we can find a value of the signal distribution parameter ² > 0 for which the following holds: Let v * ∈ (0, 1) be the best symmetric PPE payoff under discount factor δ. Then, there exists a feasible payoff profile (v 0 1 , v 0 2 ) such that v 0 1 + v 0 2 = 2v * , where we have
As this condition (44) becomes more stringent as K → ∞, if we choose (small) ² that corresponds to a large K, we need a fairly large discount factor δ to support v * . Note that condition (44) is satisfied if δ is sufficiently large, as in Figure A . Hence, when we have the situation depicted in Figure B with small δ, condition (44) fails for any feasible payoff profile (v 0 1 , v 0 2 ) such that v 0 1 + v 0 2 = 2v * . Therefore, the value of δ given by Figure B is a lower bound of the discount factor that supports the symmetric PPE payoff v * . 
Note that this is an increasing function with δ(1) = 1 and δ(0) → 1 as K → ∞. This means that to support any positive value, we need a fairly large discount factor when the signal distribution parameter ² is small (hence K is large). The inverse function of δ(·),
is concave and depicted in Figure C . 
